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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ALBERTSON'S, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

HONORABLE ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General of the State
of Utah, and HONORABLE R. PAUL
VAN DA.M, County Attorney of
Salt Lake County,

Case No. 15775

Defendants and Respondents.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action by Albert-

son's, Inc. (hereinafter "Albertson's") against Honorable
Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, and Honorable R.
Paul Van Darn, County Attorney of Salt Lake County, seeking
declaratory judgment that its retail sales promotion known
as "Double Cash Bingo" is not subject to prosectuion as
"gambling" or a "lottery" within the terms of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11, Utah Code Annotated (1977 Supplement).
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2.

Disposition of the Case Below.

This action was

commenced by plaintiff's filing a complaint and, later, an
amended complaint for declaratory judgment.

Defendant Van

Darn filed a motion to dismiss (presenting matters outside
the pleadings, thus converting the motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment).
filed a motion to dismiss.

R. 44.

R. 59.

Defendant Hansen also

Plaintiff filed a motion

for summary judgment that "it is not subject to prosecution
for violation of the Utah Penal Code for conducting Double
Cash Bingo."

R. 95.

There was no dispute among the parties

as to any material fact.

On April 4, 1978, after a hearing

on the cross-motions, the District Court entered judgment
dismissing plaintiff's action and denying plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment.
3.

R. 149-150.

Relief Sought on Appeal.

Plaintiff seeks reversal

of the District Court's judgment and direction that the District Court enter the judgment sought by its motion below.
4.

The Proceedings Below.
A.

The Events Leading to the Action's Com-

mencement.

For several weeks prior to March 3,

1978, Albertson's conducted a retail sales promotion known as "Double Cash Bingo" in its various stores throughout the State of Utah and in
ten other states, without complaint from any law
enforcement authorities.

R. 98.

"Double Cash

-2- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bingo" was a game in which the player received
a "bingo"-type card and a disc containing numbers under opaque covers.

The player uncovered

the numbers on the disc; if those numbers created a winning "bingo" pattern, the player received a designated cash prize.

Any member of

the public could participate in the game, simply
by asking for a card at any Albertson's store. A
player was not required to make any payment or to
transact any business with Albertson's.

Ibid.

Garnes such as "Double Cash Bingo" are an accepted form of sales promotion in the retail industry throughout the United States, just as are
trading stamps and other techniques.

The spon-

soring stores derive no revenue from the games,
but use them as a means of generating corporate
goodwill.

R. 98, 100-101.

On March 2, 1978, defendant Van Darn threatened
Albertson's and its employees with criminal prosecution, pursuant to his interpretation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 11, Utah Code Annotated (UTAH
CODE ANN.

§76-10-1101, et seq.

(1977 Supp.), here-

inafter sometimes "Part 11"), if "Double Cash
Bingo" was not discontinued immediately.

R. 96.

Solely because of that threat, Albertson's

-3-
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discontinued the game on March 3 and has lost
substantial sales and goodwill as a result.

R.

98-99.
Albertson's believes that "Double Cash
Bingo" is not unlawful and wishes to resume the
game.

It brought the present action, pursuant

to the terms of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-33-2 (1977
Repl. Vol.), as one whose rights are affected by
a statute, to have the statute's construction and
validity determined and to obtain a declaration
of its rights thereunder.
B.

The Statutes.

Prior to 1973, gambling-

type activities were governed by Title 76, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code Annotated (UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-27-1, et seq. (1953)).

That Chapter, en-

titled "Gaming", prohibited two discrete classes
of unlawful conduct--"game[s] of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge et noir, rondo" and similar games (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)) and
similar games (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953))
and "lotteries" (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-9 (1953)).
Conducting a prohibited game

was a felony, re-

gardless of whether the player wagered or risked
anything of value on the outcome.

UTAH CODE

ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)). Neither a game played for
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money nor a lottery could be exempted from former Chapter 27's scope on the ground that it
was a lawful business transaction or for any
other reason.
In 1973, the Legislature, by enacting Part 11,
coopletely overhauled the State's gambling statutes.

Rather than continuing separate offenses of

"gaming" and "lotteries", the new statute created
a single misdemeanor, known as "gambling" (as well
as other offenses known as "gambling fraud" and
"gambling promotion").

UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-10-1102

through 1104 (1977 Supp.).
Part 11, entitled "Gambling", differs from its
predecessor in the following particulars:
(1)

It prohibits "gambling" (which in-

eludes "lotteries"), which is defined as
risking anything of value for a return
or risking anything of value on the outcome of a contest, game, [etc.] ... when
the return or outcome is based upon an
element of chance and is in accord with
an agreement or understanding that someone will receive something of value in
the event of a certain outcome, and gambling includes a lottery ...
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1).

The former

statute prohibited all "games", regardless
of whether the player risked anything of
value (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)) and
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prohibited all "lotteries" in which the
player "paid ... any valuable consideration for [his] chance . . .
ANN.

UTAH CODE

§76-27-9 (1953);
(2)

It exempts "lawful business

transaction[s]" from its prohibitions,
even if those transactions otherwise
would constitute "gambling" or "lotteries".
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-llOl(l)(a) (1977
Supp.).

The former statute contained no

exemptions; and
(3)

It limits

the

term "value"

(as in "anything of value" or "valuable
consideration") to discernible monetary
value.

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(3).

The former statute contained no such limitation.
The Legislature undertook a substantial reworking
of Utah's gambling legislation in its drafting of
Part 11.

It is well established that a legisla-

ture, in enacting substantial changes in a statute,
is deemed to have intended to change, rather than
re-enact, prior existing law.

Roy L. Houck & Sons

v. Ellis, 229 Or. 21, 336 P.2d 166, 171 (1961)
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("Ordinarily, any substantial change in the phraseology of a statutory provision indicates an intention on the legislature's part to change the meaning of such provision ... "); Trump v. Badet, 84
Ariz. 319, 327 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1958)

("[I]t is

presumed that the legislature by amending a statute intends to make a change in existing law");
Meenen v. Meenen, 180 Kan. 779, 308 P.2d 158, 163
(1957)

("A change in phraseology ... of the origi-

nal act, raises a presumption that a change in meaning was also intended ... ").

Part 11 merges the

two fonnerly distinct offenses of "gaming" and
"lottery" into the single offense of "gambling",
creates a category of transactions which, although
they otherwise would be prohibited as "gambling"
by the statute's terms (and were prohibited by the
prior statute), are exempt from its prohibition,
and limits "value", a theretofore unlimited term,
to items of discernible monetary value.
Part 11 has not been construed by this Court. 1

1

Geis v. Continental Oil Co., 29 Utah 2d 452, 511 P.2d
725 (1973), which was relied upon by defendants in their motions below, was decided on June 22, 1973--after the adjournment of the 1973 session of the Legislature but before Part
ll's effective date of June 30, 1973.
It did not construe,
nor even refer to, the new statute.
The Court's forebearance was proper, of course, A statute enacted after the
transactions leading to the Geis suit could not affect its
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Although it is a criminal statute, Part 11 is
unclear in a vital particular.

While §1101(1)

defines "gambling" as "risking anything of value
for a return or ... upon the outcome of a contest, game, [etc.] ... when the return or outcome is based upon an element of chance", it does
not define, nor provide any guidelines for defining, an "element of chance"--even though the statute, taken literally, would prohibit every transaction in human history.
C.

Defendants' Motions.

Both defendants

based their motions substantially on the decision
of Geis v. Continental Oil Co., 29 Utah 2d 452,
511 P.2d 725 (1973).
Defendant Van Darn asserted that "the issues
raised by Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are resolved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
in ... Geis v. Continental Oil Co." and that, according to the Geis decision--as defendant read

outcome. UTAH CODE ANN. §§68-2-8,9 (1967 Repl. Vol.) The
Legislature may not be deemed to have adopted Geis' later
construction of the former statute--if Geis may-be considered to have construed the former statute at all--in its
drafing of Part 11. Cf., District of Columbia v. Johnson &
Wimsatt, Inc., 160 F.ZcI 913, 914-915 (D.C. Cir. 1947), ~
denied, 332 U.S. 760 (1947); Ward v. Northern Ohio Tel. Co.,
251 F. Supp. 606, 608-609 (N.D. Ohio 1966), aff'd per curiam,
381 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1967).
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it--a "player's time, attention, thought, energy
and money spent in transportation to the store
for a chance to win a prize" in Double Cash Bingo
render the game unlawful gambling.

R. 45.

Defendant Hansen similarly asserted, apparently in reliance upon Geis:
The game in question contains the elements of (1) prizes, ... (2) chance, ...
and (3) consideration, because participants
must spend time, attention, thought, energy
and transportation to the Plaintiff's business location.
It is also submitted that
once the participants get to the store that
participant, more than likely, purchases
some items, thereby expending money. '
Once the elements of lottery are present, the game cannot be considered a lawful
business transaction because it is an illegal
operation contrary to the Utah Constitution
and other Utah statutes.
R. 64-65.
Neither defendant addressed the terms of the
present gambling statute--even though it must be
presumed that the Legislature, in making substantial changes in the gambling statute, intended to
change the existing law--nor attempted to determine
what in Geis was holding and what was dictum.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND DENIED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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I.

"DOUBLE CASH BINGO" IS NOT UNLAWFUL UNDER THE
TERMS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101, ET SEQ.
(1977 SUPP.)
1.

Participants in Double Cash Bingo did not risk "any-

thing of value", nor give "valuable consideration"

as

a

condition of receiving a prize or return.
A game constitutes "gambling" or a "lottery" under the
terms of Part 11 only if it requires a risk of "anything of
value" or payment (or promise) of "valuable consideration" by
the players.

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) ,(2) (1977 Supp.).

Participants in Double Cash Bingo were not required to spend
any money, make any purchase or pay, promise or risk anything
else, which in ordinary understanding could be considered
2
"valuable", as a term or condition of playing the game.
2 Indeed, the Bingo players' investment was indistinguishable from that of participants in the lottery for National
Collegiate Athletic Association tickets which also was the
subject of recent threats by the Salt Lake County Attorney.
In that case, the Attorney General, in an opinion letter to
the President of the University of Utah, stated:
[I)t is clear that no criminal lottery is
involved because the third essential element, "valuable consideration," is nonexistent. Applicants
pay no money to NCAA for the chance to buy tickets.
Unless one considers the cost of the postage stamp,
cost of the envelope, and any minimal interest lost
on the check or money order during the few days required to process the applications, there is no
cost at all to the applicant. Presumably a minimal
amount of time, attention, thought and energy are
involved.
-10-
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"Gambling" is defined at UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1)
(1977 Supp.) as "risking anything of value" on the outcome
of a game or other event; "lottery"

is defined at §76-10-1101

(2) as payment of, or promise to pay, "valuable consideration"
in return for a chance.
fines "value".

Neither Subsection (1) nor (2) de-

However, §76-10-1101(3) provides:

"Gambling bet" means money, checks, credit, or
any other representation of value.
Application of the canon of ejusdem generis, which is mandated
by this Court in such situations, limits "value" as used in
Subsection (3), to discernible monetary value--the kind of
value which money, checks and credit represent.

This Court

has held:
[W]hen general terms are used following express
ones the general must be understood in the light
of and as characterized by the specific and
limited to things of like kind.
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 265,
272 P.2d 177 (1954).

Accord, Townsend v. Board of Review, 27

Utah 2d 94, 96, 493 P.2d 614 (1972)

("[W]hen general words or

terms follow specific ones, the general must be understood as
applying to things of the same kind as the specific"); Stone
v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 204, 356 P.2d 631 (1960).

Attorne General's 0 inion Letter to President David P. Gardner, March 9, 1978, pp. 2- .
(The Attorney General, in t is
matter, has not attempted to explain why he considers an
NCAA lottery participant's time, attention, thought and energy
to be "minimal" but an Albertson's game player's time, attention, thought and energy not to be.)

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

The rule should be applied with particular stringency in
construing criminal statutes.
880, 156 P.2d 7, 17 (1945).

People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d
Obviously, the act of walking

into a grocery store--even at the risk of being tempted to
buy something--or the "time, attention, thought and energy"
required to fill out a bingo card could not constitute
"value" for purposes of Subsection (3).
The Legislature, in enacting Part 11, intended to
create new law.

In defining "gambling bets" in Section

1101(3)--which had no predecessor in the prior statute--it
clearly limited "value" to the kind of discernible monetary
value which money, checks and credit represent.

It must be

presumed that it intended "value" to be similarly limited
when, in describing gambling risks, it used the term "anything of value" in Subsection (1)--which also was a completely
new provision--and "valuable consideration" in Subsection (2).

1

It is a rule of Utah statutory construction that

3 The above definition of "value", "anything of value"
and "valuable consideration" is consistent with the Penal
Code's definition of "anything of value" at UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-6-401 (1977 Supp.) as:
... real estate, tangible and intangible personal
property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments and other writings representing or embodying rights ... or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of
a public utility nature ... and trade secrets ...
-12-
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... presumptively when [a] term ... is used more
than once in the same statute, unless manifest
differences require a different meaning to be attached, the words carry the same meaning.
Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 150, 134 P.2d 180 (1943).
Accord, Rosemary Properties, Inc. v. Mccolgan, 29 Cal. 2d
677, 177 P. 2d 757, 763 (1947) ("The legislature could not
have intended to use a significant word in two different
senses in the same statute"); Corey v. Knight, 150 Cal. App.
2d 671, 310 P.2d 673, 679 (1957); DeGrief v. City of Seattle,
50 Wash. 2d 1, 297 P.2d 940, 946 (1956) ("' [IJ]hen similar
words are used in different parts of a statute, the meaning
is presumed to be the same throughout'").
Construed by the required canons of interpretation,
Part 11 limits

"gambling" and "lotteries" to those games

which involve a risk of items of discernible monetary value,
which construction, by the way, is consistent with the clear
majority rule defining those terms.

~·,

State ex rel.

Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 !font. 52, 132
P.2d 689, 696-697 (1942) ("We cannot, therefore, construe
the words 'to pay any valuable consideration for the chance'
as meaning to suffer such slight detriment as that necessary
to participate in the drawing ... ");People v. Cardas, 137
Cal. App. Supp. 788, 28 P.2d 99, 101 (1933) ("The fact that
such cards or chances were given away to induce persons to
visit their store with the expectation that they might
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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purchase goods, and thereby increase their trade, is a benefit too remote to constitute a consideration for the chances");
Goodwill Adv. Co. v. Elmwood Amusement Corp., 86 R.I. 6, 133

I

A. 2d 644, 647-648 (1957); Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190
S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782, 786-788 (1939); Affiliated Enterprises
Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3, 6-7

(N. D.

Ill.

1937).
2.

Double Cash Bingo is exempt from Part ll's prohibi-

tion on the sround that it is a lawful business transaction.
The term "gambling" (which includes "lottery"), contained
in UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) (1977 Supp.), does not inelude "lawful business transaction [ s]", which otherwise would
constitute gambling.
Supp.).

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) (a) (1977

That term is not defined by the statute and, being

an exemption from a criminal statute, it must be construed in
favor of a transaction's legitimacy.

Utah law requires that

exceptions in penal statutes ought to be liberally construed in favor of him who is charged
with the violation of the provisions of the
statute.
Schuyler v. Southern Pac. Co., 37 Utah 581, 606, 109 Pac. 458
(1909), aff'd, 227 U.S. 601 (1913).

The canon of inter-

pretation required by Schuyler is buttressed by the requirement of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-104 (1977 Supp.) that
[t]he provisions of [the Penal Code] shall be
construed in accordance with these general purposes.
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

(2)
Define adequately conduct and mental
state which constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.
Double Cash Bingo is solely a retail sales promotion.
Albertson's derives no revenue whatever from the game. R. 98.
It is undisputed that games of type are an accepted form of
sales promotion in the retail food industry, which is used
throughout the United States.

R. 100-101.

Double Cash Bingo manifests none of the vices normally
associated with "gambling":

the inducement of persons to

squander their resources on wagers, a commerce in wagers, the
frequently unscrupulous collection methods associated with
gambling and the alleged tendency of gambling to become an
adjunct to other antisocial activities, such as prostitution
or narcotics.

As the court noted in Affiliated Enterprises,

Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., supra at 6:
The general purpose of the lottery statutes
is to prevent members of the public from being
cheated and defrauded of their money in return for
something which may or may not be of greater
value than the sum which they have invested ...
" ... [The subject promotion] did not present a lottery scheme, because a lottery involves a scheme
for raising money by selling chances to share in
the distribution of prizes . . . . Thus the conclusion must be that there was no special intent
to cheat or induce members of the public into buying something, or paying something for a chance.
Instead ... there was a general intent and general
purpose to present something ... which would catch
the public eye and increase the circulation of the
-15-
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~aper.

We view this ... [as a device for] increasin the circulation of the ublication, rather than
as a deliberate scheme to wron members o the ublic.
Emphasis added.

(Citing Post Publ. Co. v. Murray, 230 Fed. 773, 776 (1st Cir.
1916).)

Similarly, in People v. Cardas, supra, 28 P.2d at

101, the court held:
"The gratuitous distribution of property by
lot or chance ... does not constitute the offense.
In such case, the person receiving the chance is
not induced to hazard money with the hope of obtaining a larger value, or to part with his money
at all; and the spirit of gambling is not cultivated or stimulated, which is the essential evil
of lotteries ... which our statute is designed
to prevent
"
(Citing Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821, 822
(1896).)
The County Attorney urged below that the sole purpose
of the lawful business transaction exemption is "obviously
to remove from the operation of the criminal code, chancy
business transactions such as stock purchases, real estate
speculation and the like" (R. 46), but offered no authority
whatever for that assertion.

Indeed, it has been so univer-

sally recognized that commercial speculation is not gambling
(~., Damler v.

Baine, 114 Ind. App. 534, 51 N.E.2d 885, 888

(1943); Dillaway v. Alden, 88 Me. 230, 33 Atl. 981, 982
(1895)), that such an exemption would have been superfluous
by 1973, especially since the Code had done without one in
prior years.

Further Part 11 limits "gambling" to "risking

-16- by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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anything of value upon the outcome of a contest, game, gaming scheme or gaminf, device".

"Chancy business transactions"

such as real estate purchases are not risks based upon the
outcome of games or contests.

The Legislature simply could

not have conceived them to be potentially within §1101(1) 's
scope; therefore it would have had no reason to exempt them.
The County Attorney has urged, in effect, that §1101(1) (a) is a
superfluous and unnecessary act; the accepted canons reject
such a construction.

E.g., Roza Irr. Dist. v. State, 80

Wash. 2d 633, 497 P.2d 166, 171 (1972); Stafford v. Realty
Bond Ser,. Corp., 39 Cal. 797, 249 P.2d 241, 245 (1952).
Subsection (l)(a) 's exemption of lawful business
transactions must be construed to favor legitimacy.

Further,

it must be construed as a meaningful, rather than superfluous, act.

It would have been an idle gesture for the Legis-

lature in 1973 to "exempt", for the first time, transactions
which never had been challenged under prior Utah gambling
statutes or ordinances and which for so long had been accepted
throughout the nation as being distinct from gambling. The only
plausible construction of the subsection is that it was intended to exempt those promotional transactions--even if they
involve a payment of some small consideration (which Double
Cash Bingo did not) and otherwise would have been "gambling"
or "lotteries"--which are incidents of an accepted business
and

are

not susceptible to the vices frequently associated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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with either organized or "street" gambling.

Double Cash

Bingo--like the promotions held legal in Affiliated Enterprises, Cardas and other cases--does not "cultivate ... the
essential evil" which Part 11 is intended to prohibit and,
in fact, has no reason for existence other than the stimulation of a useful and lawful business.
3.

Double Cash Bingo is not in violation of the Utah

Penal Code by reason of the Geis decision.
A.

Geis did not state a rule of law applic-

able to this case.

Defendants' claim of Double

Cash Bingo's criminality at the District Court
consisted of two points:

that such a finding is

required by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Geis v. Continental Oil Co., supra, and Article
VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution.
46, 62-64.

R. 45-

Defendants urged below that Geis re-

quires a finding that a player's "expenditure"
of mere "time, attention, thought, energy and
[possibly] money spent in transportation" to Albertson's made Double Cash Bingo an unlawful
lottery. R. 45.
The short answer to a reliance upon Geis,
quite simply, is that the statute under which
that case was decided--UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1,
et seq.

(1953)--has been superseded by Part 11,
-18-
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which defines "value" as discernible IDonetary
value and which exempts lawful business enterprises from its prohibition.

The earlier stat-

ute did not contain those provisions.

Geis is

not applicable to the present statute.
Geis further did not hold, as was suggested
in the proceedings below, that participation in a
free game was sufficient consideration to render
the game unlawful.

It simply held that plain-

tiffs could not recover on what they themselves
had alleged to be a contract based upon unlawful
consideration. The question of whether a valuable
consideration actually existed neither was raised
nor argued by either party to that appeal.
The facts of the Geis case were these:

Mr.

and Mrs. Ed Geis had participated in a promotional game sponsored by Continental Oil Company ("Conoco") which was similar to Double Cash
Bingo.

Mrs. Geis presented what she alleged

was a winning card to Conoco and claimed entitlement to a $1,000.00 prize.

Conoco, believing the

card to have been altered, refused to pay the
prize.

Mrs. Geis sued Conoco, alleging that a con-

tract existed between her and the company by which
Conoco was required to pay $1,000.00 upon her
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presentation of a winning card.

Conoco did not

deny the existence of a contract; it simply
claimed that Mrs. Geis, in altering her card,
had failed to comply with the contract's terms.
29 Utah 2d at 453-454; Record on Appeal No. 13049
in the Utah Supreme Court, po. 1-4.
The case was tried to a jury, which found
that Mrs. Geis had not altered the card and found
for her on the contract.

Conoco appealed, assert-

ing that the jury verdict was plainly contrary to
the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
2d at 452-454.

29 Utah

This Court reversed the judgment

below, noting that Mrs. Geis, by the very allegations of her complaint, had alleged an unlawful
contract.

The majority opinion held:

... (T]his court would be engaging in
some type of sophistry to hold that there
was consideration present to support a bargain but not to provide the element of consideration to constitute a lottery.
Since plaintiffs cannot establish their
claim independent of a transaction prohibited by law, the courts cannot grant them
relief.
Id. at 456.

The Court did not find that the Geises

had given Conoco valuable consideration; it simply
recognized that they had painted themselves into a
corner.

The had no right of recovery against Conoco
-20-
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unless they were parties to a contract with it;
they could not be parties to a contract unless
they had given Conoco valuable consideration.
If they had given Conoco valuable consideration,
they had engaged in an unlawful lottery under
the terms of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-9 (1953) .

4

The majority did note, in passing, the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in State
ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 75
Wash. 2d 339, 450 P.2d 949 (1969), that the
mere act of visiting a store constituted sufficient consideration to create an unlawful transaction.

29 Utah 2d at 455.

However, the major-

ity nowhere stated that this was the law of
Utah.

Because plaintiffs had alleged the exis-

tence of a contract, and thus consideration,

4
For reasons which are not immediately clear from examination of the record and briefs, Conoco did not simply deny
the existence of a contract.
The denial would have been wellfounded; a game such as Double Cash Bingo does not create an
enforceable contract.
The awarding of prizes is purely gratuitous. A participant in Double Cash Bingo bases his expectation of a return not upon an enforceable legal obligation by
Albertson's, but upon Albertson's' reputation for honest dealing and upon the enormous importance of maintaining that kind of
reputation.
Stated simply, Albertson's does not pay prizes
under duress of law; it does so under duress of conscience
and obvious sound business judf,ment.

-21-
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that question was moot. 5
B.

The rule, attributed by defendants to

the Geis decision, that such inconsequential
matters as the time, attention, thought, energy
and possible cost of transportation which are
involved in a promotional game could constitute
"valuable consideration" is unsound and should
be disavowed by this Court.

As has been demon-

strated in prior sections of this brief, Part
11 has removed promotional games such as Double
Cash Bingo from the criminal prohibition against
gambling and lotteries by means of the "lawful
business transaction" exemption and further has
limited the term "valuable consideration" as

5 Even if the majority had made a statement of Utah law,
that statement would have been dictum only. A court's noting
a concession of counsel cannot be deemed a holding.
Peoule v
Levine, 161 Misc. 336, 291 NYS 1001 (1936); Lusk v. Seal, 12~
Miss. 228, 91 So. 386 (1922).
Further, this Court held in
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comrn'n, 73 Utah 199, 205, 273 Pac
306 (1929):
It may be said that dictum is one of two kinds-one, the expression of an opinion by the court or a
judge of a mere collateral question not involved or
of mere argument or illustration ... not argued or
briefed by counsel . . . .
Accord, State v. Salt Lake County, 96 Utah 464, 479, 85 P.2d
851 (1938) ("Court decisions are authoritative only upon
questions of law or fact actually presented ... ").
-22-
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used therein to include only items of discernible monetary value.

Therefore, even if the

Court had held in Geis that participation in
a lottery similar to Double Cash Bingo was unlawful under the former statute, that decision
would be inapplicable to Part 11.

However,

the interpretation of "valuable consideration"
which was urged upon the District Court by
defendants herein would be unsound under any
statutory scheme and should be rejected.
As was mentioned in Geis, the Washirrgton
Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Schillberg
v. Safewav Stores, Inc., supra, that the mere
act of going to a store to pick up a game card
constituted sufficiently "valuable consideration" to make that game an unlawful lottery.
Such an interpretation flies in the face of
common sense and has been rejected by one jurisdiction after another.

The Oregon Supreme

Court in Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 233 Or. 272,
377 P.2d 150, 158-159 (1962), upholding a promotional game similar to Double Cash Bingo,
held:
[No one could be rendered poor by participating in the plaintiffs' drawings.
-23-
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The worst that could happen to anyone
would be that he would buy some groceries.
But, if he purchased any, he
would do so not in order to qualify
himself as a participant in the drawing- -for participation was free--but
voluntarily.
His purchase would not
enhance in the slightest degree his
chances upon the drawings.
Participation in the drawings could not become
for him a gambling tendency.
There
was nothing that anyone could do that
would improve his prospects of winning.
. . . In order to participate in the
drawings it was not necessary for anyone to spend a nickel in the store or
in any other place. Tickets for the
drawings and tickets to the parking
lot (where the drawings occurred) were
not for sale. They were free.
Anyone
who wished to do so could enter the
parking lot and watch, free of charge,
the drawings take place. This promotional scheme is a mere means of drawing customers to the plaintiffs'
stores . . . . The scheme is not a lottery
although the prize money is distributed
by chance.
It is not a lottery because
there is no consideration which is in
any way harmful to the participant.
The participant parts with nothing of
any value to himself.
[Emphasis added.]
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held in People
v. Cardas, supra, 28 P.2d 99, 100 (1933):
Counsel for the people argue that patronage from the ticket holders as a
whole constituted consideration for
the distribution of the prizes, even
though the individual holders of tickets had not parted with consideration
for the individual ticket held by them.
This argument apparently proceeds upon
the theory that the element of consideration is established by showing that
the defendant received something of
value in return for the distribution
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of the prizes.
The question of consideration is not to be determined
from the standpoint of the defendant,
but from that of the holders of prize
tickets.
The question is:
Did the
holders of prize tickets pay a valuable consideration for the chance?
Certainly those who received prize
tickets without buying an admission
ticket did not pay anything for the
chance of getting the prize. They
did not hazard anything of value.
[Emphasis added.]
Accord, State v. Eames, 87 N.H. 477, 183 Atl.
590' 592 (1936).
Numerous jurisdictions have refused to find
"such slight detriment as that necessary to participate in [a] drawing" to constitute "valuable
consideration" for purposes of a gambling statute.

~-,

State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre
Corp. , supra, 132

P. 2d

at

696-697.

It is the

rule of the great majority of the jurisdictions
which have considered the question that "valuable
consideration" must be something of discernible
pecuniary value.

~'

People v. Eagle Food Cen-

ters, Inc., 31 Ill. 2d 535, 202 N.E.2d 473, 476
(1964); Albert Lea Amusement Co. v. Elmwood
Amusement Corp. , 231 Minn. 401, 43 N. H. 2d 2Li-9,
254 (1950); Darlington Theatres v. Coker, supra;
Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfs.
Corp., supra.

The majority rule makes vastly
-25-
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more sense than does Schillberg.

The major-

ity should be followed by Utah.
4.

Double Cash Bingo is not a criminal act by reason

of the terms of Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution.
Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The Legislature shall not authorize any
game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise
under any pretense or for any purpose.
Section 28 prohibits only acts by the Legislature; it does
not prohibit acts by private parties, much less make private
parties' acts criminal.

(Those portions of the Constitution

which prohibit acts by private

parties--~.,

Article XII,

§§5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19 and 20--are specific in addressing
themselves to private parties; Sections 19 and 20 specifically create a criminal sanction.)

Authorization of a lot-

tery is not at issue in this case.

The question before the

Court is whether plaintiff's game is a crime.
It is clear that Article VI, Section 28 was intended
only to prohibit the creation of a public lottery.

State

lotteries had led to serious scandals in other states during
the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The Article's

purpose is clear from the debate in the Constitutional Convention:
-26-
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Mr. VAI;i HOR_WE. Mr. President, I hope that
article will not go out . . . . But we know by
common report that there were a million and a
half dollars in the hands of men besieging the
legislature of North Dakota to grant the franchise for a lottery. A great deal has been
said about the necessity of our putting guards
around the Legislature for their future action
in matters that have not the magnitude that
that would have.
It seems to me that it would
be well to leave in the Constitution a orohibition against granting a franchise that common
consent of the country holds to be an immoral
franchise and detrimental to the public good.
I hope the section will not be stricken out.
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, I am
entirely opposed to the striking out of this
section. . . . I believe that we ought to put
an inhibition upon the Legislature to permit
a thing of this kind. My friend from Salt -Lake
says the Legislature cannot be bamboozled into
granting such a franchise.
I say let us make
a prohibition in the Constitution so that they
will not even consider the question at all.
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,

p. 937, April

12, 1895.
II.

THE APPLICABLE GA.M'3LING STATUTE IS VOID FOR
VAGUENESS.
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101 (1) defines "gambling" as
"risking anything of value for a return or . . . upon the outcome of a contest, game,

[etc.]

... when the return or out-

come is based upon an element of chance . . . . "

Obviously,

every event in life is based upon an "element of chance",
but the statute provides no

guidance as to what is the requi-

site "element of chance" which will render a transaction criminal.
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A statute which forbids an act in terms so vague that
men of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning violates the due process guarantees of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.

Basin

Flying Services, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 531 P.2d
1303, 1305 (Utah 1975).

This Court stated in State v. Pack-

ard, 122 Utah 369, 375, 250 P.2d 561 (1952):
[T]here is no disagreement among the courts that
where a rule is set up, the violation of which
subjects one to criminal punishment, the restrictions upon conduct should be described with sufficient certainty, so that persons of ordinary
intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know
how to govern themselves in conformity with it,
and that no one should be compelled at the peril
of life, liberty or property, to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes.
Part 11 fails to meet the test which the Packard decision
imposes.
CONCLUSION
Double Cash Bingo is not "gambling" or a "lottery"
withing the terms of the present Utah Penal Code.

Even if

it were within that Code's reach, the present gambling
statute is unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable
against appellant.

The judgment of the Court below should

be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of Hay, 1978.
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THE CONSTITUTION
OF
THE UNITED STATES
Amendment XIV, Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
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THE CONSTITUTION
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

-32-
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THE CONSTITUTION
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
Article VI, Section 28.
The Legislature shall not authorize any
game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise under
any pretense or for any purpose.

-33-
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UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1
(1953)
GAMING
Operation a felony.--Seizure and destruction
of paraphernalia.--Every person who deals or carries
on, opens or causes to be opened, or who conducts,
either as owner or employee, whether for hire or not,
any game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge
et noir, rondo, or any game played with cards, dice
or any other device, for money, checks, credit or
any other representative of value is guilty of a felony, and it shall be the duty of all sheriffs, constables, police and other peace officers whenever it
shall come to the knowledge of such officer that any
person has in his possession any cards, tables,
checks, balls, wheels, slot machines or gambling devices of any nature or kind whatsoever used or kept
for the purpose of playing for money, or for tokens
redeemable in money, at any of the games mentioned in
this chapter, or that any cards, tables, checks, balls
wheels, slot machines or gambling devices used or
kept for the purposes aforesaid may be found in any
place, to seize and take such cards, tables, checks,
balls, wheels, slot machines or other gambling devices, and convey the same before a magistrate of the
county in which such devices shall be found; and it
shall be the duty of such magistrate to inquire of
such witnesses as he shall summon or as may appear
before him in that behalf touching the nature of such
gambling devices, and, if such magistrate shall determine that the same are used or kept for the purpose of being used at any game or games of chance
described in this chapter, it shall be his duty to
destroy the same.
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UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-9
(1953)
"Lottery" defined.--A lottery is any
scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons who have paid or
promised to pay any valuable consideration for
the chance of obtaining such property or a portion of it, or for any share of any interest in
such property, upon any agreement, understanding
or expectation that it is to be distributed or
disposed of by lot or chance, whether called a
lottery, raffle or gift enterprise, or by whatever name the same may be known.
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UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101
(1977 Supp.)
Definitions.--For purposes of this part:
(1)
"Gambling" means risking anything of
value for a return or risking anything of value
upon the outcome of a contest, game, gaming scheme,
or gaming device when the return or outcome is
based upon an element of chance and is in accord
with an agreement or understanding that someone
will receive something of value in the event of a
certain outcome, and gambling includes a lottery;
gambling does not include:
(a)

A lawful business transaction, or

(b) Playing an amusement device that confers only an immediate and unrecorded right of replay not exchangeable for value.
(2)
"Lottery" means any scheme for the
disposal or distribution of property by chance
among persons who have paid or promised to pay any
valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining
property, or portion of it, or for any share or
any interest in property, upon any agreement, understanding, or expectation that it is to be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance, whether
called a lottery, raffle, or gift enterprise, or
by whatever name it may be known.
(3)
"Gambling bet" means money, checks,
credit, or any other representation of value.
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